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Planning strategies that maximize the Human Development Index (HDI) tend towards 
minimizing consumption and maximizing non-investment expenditures on education 
and health. Interestingly, such strategies also tend towards equitable outcomes, even 
though inequality aversion is not modelled in the HDI. A problematic feature of 
strategies that maximize the HDI is that the income component in the index only role 
is to distort the allocation between health and education expenditure. Because the 
income component does not play its intended role of securing resources for a decent 
standard of living, we argue that it is better to drop income from the index in 
considering optimal plans. Alternatively, we consider net income, income net of 
education and health expenditures, as indicator of capabilities not already reflected in 
the education and life expectancy components of the index. When net income is used 
in a modified HDI index, optimal plans yield a balance between allocations for 
consumption, education, and health. Finally, we calculate our modified indexes for 
OECD countries and compare them with the HDI.       
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The Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index published annually by the 
UN Human Development Report Office, since 1990, which is designed to measure 
“human well being” in different countries.
1 The index combines measures of life 
expectancy, school enrolment, literacy, and income to provide a broader-based 
measure of well-being and development than income alone. Since its publication, this 
index has become widely cited and is commonly used as a way of ranking the quality 
of life in different countries.  
 
The impact of the HDI ranking on policy is reflected by the fact that some national 
governments have taken to announcing their HDI ranking and their aspirations for 
improving it. For example, in a recent speech, the President of India, Dr. Abdul 
Kalam, exhorts Indians to work together to improve India’s current HDI rank of 127 
to achieve a rank of 20; see Kalam (2005). The HDI is discussed in recent Indian 
budgets (e.g. Budget of India (2005)) and changes in India’s ranking are covered by 
the media (e.g. Parsai (2006)). In announcing Canada’s number one ranking in 1998, 
Prime Minister Jean Chrétien stated: “While the HDI tracks Canada’s impressive 
achievements, it also tells us where we can improve.” (Chrétien (1998)). 
 
In this paper, we consider the implications of using the HDI as a criterion for 
economic development plans. In particular, we examine the consequences of pursuing 
plans that maximize the HDI score for a given country. To do this, we construct an 
economic model where a planner chooses expenditures to maximize a well-defined 
objective function that includes the HDI index as a special case.
2 We get two main 
results. First, the planner tends towards minimizing consumption and maximizing 
expenditures on education and health. We get this result despite the fact that the HDI 
includes an income index as one of its components. Second, the optimal plan tends to 
imply equitable outcomes even though inequality aversion is not explicitly modelled 
in the HDI. This latter result is arguably a surprisingly beneficial consequence of 
using the HDI that addresses the concern for equity expressed in the Human 
                                                 
1 For a detailed description see http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/indices/. 
2 Bourguignon and Fields (1990) apply a similar methodology. They minimize various poverty indexes 
subject to redistribution constraints and show that the implied policies can differ radically depending 
on the index.    
  1Development Reports and literature (e.g. Anand and Sen (2000)). In contrast, the first 
result leads to what we consider to be a flaw with the HDI, but one that can be readily 
fixed.       
 
The first result – that the planner tends towards minimizing consumption and 
maximizing expenditure on education and health – describes a lopsided allocation.  
The reason for the lopsided allocation is that consumption does not enter the index 
(the objective function) or the production technology, but costs the planner through 
the resource constraint, so the optimal plan will set consumption to meet minimum 
consumption requirements. From another perspective this lopsided allocation arises 
because the income component in the HDI only has one role in the optimal plan and 
that is to indirect affect the allocations of funds between education and health.  
 
The logic of the first result can be readily explained in our basic model where income 
can be decomposed into expenditures on consumption, education and health. As 
consumption is at its minimal level, the remaining expenditures are allocated to 
education and health. Education and health expenditures are valued directly in those 
components of the HDI and are also valued in the income component. The HDI is 
flawed because the income component “double counts” the value of allocating 
expenditures to education and health and because it does not effectively value 
expenditures on other items.  
 
For these reasons we argue that it is better to drop income from the index in 
considering optimal plans rather using the HDI as it stands. However, this falls short 
of the original vision for the HDI as an overall composite index. The income 
component of the HDI was originally justified as an indirect proxy of “command over 
resources to enjoy a decent standard of living” (Human Development Report 1990, p. 
1).  Anand and Sen (2000, p. 86) state:  
 
The use of `command over resources’ in the HDI is strictly as a 
residual catch-all to reflect something of other basic capabilities not 
already incorporated in the measures of longevity and education.  … 
For example, going hungry is a deprivation that is serious not just for 
its tendency to reduce longevity, but also for the suffering it directly 
causes. Similarly, resources needed for shelter and for being able to 
  2travel may be quite important in generating the corresponding 
capabilities.   
 
In the later part of the paper we argue for a modified HDI that replaces the income 
component with a net income component; i.e. income that is net of expenditures on 
education and health. Plans that maximize the modified index directly trade-off the 
allocations to consumption, education and health against each other. This leads to 
plans that balance expenditures across the three components.  
 
Using data OECD countries we construct and calculate a modified human 
development index with net income component as well as a modified human 
development index without an income component. The rank orderings of nations 
given by these modified indexes is compared with the HDI. Interestingly, the 
modified index without income yields the greater change in rankings with a few 
countries standing out.      
 
The paper continues as follows. Section 2 develops the model. Section 3 solves the 
planner’s problem, and Section 4 explores equity and taxation issues. Section 5 
examines the role of income in the HDI index, and provides a critique of the income 
component. Section 6 compares the modified human development indexes both 
theoretically and empirically with the HDI. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are found 
in the Appendix. 
 
2. The model  
 
We consider a static closed economy model, where a planner acts to maximize the 
following objective function, which nests the HDI: 
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Here,  ,  , and   represent indexes of per capita income (y), educational 
attainment (e), and life expectancy (l) respectively. The indexes are each bounded 
between 0 and 100, and are assumed to be differentiable, increasing and concave in 
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y ) (e I
e ) (l I
l
  3their respective arguments.
3 The weights parameters w and W  are used when 
constructing the composite index, in equation (1). We give income a separate weight 
because we concentrate on that part of the index. Observe that the index can be 
rewritten ( , ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
y I wW w I y wIW =+ −, where  ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
el I WW I e W I l =+ −  part o 
the index not containing income.  The HDI is a special case of this index, where w = 
1/3 and W = 1/2, so that each of the three component indexes are equally weighted.  
 
Educational attainment is assumed to be a differentiable increasing function of 
expenditures on both education (E) and health (H). Thus:  
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Similarly, life expectancy is differentiable and increasing in both of these arguments
4: 
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To simplify the analysis, we are assuming that the economy in question has a level of 
per capita income high enough so that neither income nor consumption substantially 
affect life expectancy and educational attainment as measured in the HDI. This is 
formalized by the following assumption about individual consumption c: 
 
                                                                                                                        (4)  min c c ≥
 
where  > 0 is a parameter which identifies the level of consumption beyond which 
no further increments in consumption will increase educational attainment or life 
expectancy.
min c
5 Later we relax constraint (4) and show that the results become stronger.   
                                                 
3 In the HDI the income of $100 US corresponds to the index being 0 and the  “goalpost”, of 
$40,000US corresponds to the index being 100. As of 2004 two countries, the US and Luxembourg, 
had achieved the $40,000US goalpost. The income index is logarithmic in income between the bounds. 
The education and life expectancy indexes are linear in their variables. The education variable e is a 
linear combination of literacy rates and school enrolment rates, and as of 2004, there were 5 countries 
that scored enrolment rates that yielded 100 on this index. No country has achieved the goalpost for life 
expectancy, which is currently 85. No country is at the lower bound for any of the indexes.  Our 
analysis goes through for any country as long as there is at least one index that falls short of 100.  
Indeed, we do not even need concavity for our results but assume it for simplicity.    
4 We have taken the short cut of specifying life expectancy (education) as a function of education 
(health) expenditure rather than education (health) attainment. Functions (3) and (4) can be shown to be 
consistent with the more general specification under minor restrictions. Assuming that minimum life 
expectancy is positive simplifies the analysis.     
5 This assumption is consistent with Anand and Ravallion’s (1993) “capability expansion through 
social services”. According to this explanation (also see Sen, 1981), the public provision of essential 
goods and services leads to improved social outcomes and income matters if it is used to finance 
suitable public services and alleviate poverty.  For example, Anand and Ravallion find in a sample of 
  4 
In this simple static economy, we abstract away from capital and assume full 
utilization of labour. All individuals’ work and the total number of workers in the 
economy is normalized to one unit. Given this, output per capita is determined by the 
following differentiable production technology: 
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Here, education attainment affects output through human capital in the usual way. 
Also, increments in life expectancy increase the effective size of the labour force and 
thereby increase production. Increments in life expectancy can be thought to increase 
the effective size of the labour force in two ways: directly through increasing the 
possible amount of work time per individual over a life time and indirectly by 
indicating better health and hence greater productivity.   
 
Once produced, the single good in the economy can be allocated to three possible 
uses: aggregate consumption ( ), education expenditure (E), and health expenditure 
(H). Therefore, the economy must respect the aggregate constraint: 
c l ⋅
 
                                                     y H E lc ≤ + +                                                          (6) 
 
Observe that consumption, c, is on items other than health and education and that we 
allow total consumption to be proportional to life expectancy. We only analyze 
situations where there is at least one feasible allocation (c, E, H) satisfying equations 
2-6 and the non-negatively constraints E ≥ 0 and H ≥ 0. A sufficient condition for this 
is that lcmin  ≤ y  when E = H = 0; i.e. minimum output can meet minimum 




                                                                                                                                            
22 developing countries that after controlling for health expenditures and poverty (as measured by the 
proportion of population consuming less than one dollar per day in 1985 at PPP), life expectancy is not 
affected by consumption. Even the unconditional plot of income against life expectancy displays an 
income threshold (roughly 10,000 US dollars at purchasing power parity) beyond which there is no 
discernable relationship (e.g. Deaton, 2003)). Anand and Ravallion contrast schools of thought on the 
importance of social services versus private consumption for human development. 
  5Using equations 1-6, the planner’s problem can be formulated as the programming 
problem (P1): 
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Proposition 1.  In the planner’s problem, incremental reductions in consumption, c, 
towards cmin  increase the HDI score. Maximizing the HDI requires  setting 
consumption at the minimum level,  , and allocating the remaining output to 
education and health expenditure,  .   
min
* c c =
** * *
min EH yl c += −
 
The intuition behind these “efficiency” results is quite straightforward. Consumption 
does not enter the objective function or the production technology, but costs the 
planner through the resource constraint. Thus, reductions in consumption that are 
optimally allocated to education and health expenditures will increase the HDI. The 
optimal plan will set consumption to its minimal allowed value. Our formulation with 
a minimum consumption requirement clearly reveals that all remaining resources are 
allocated to those expenditures, education and/or health, which increase the objective 
function.
6       
 
The fact that the minimum consumption constraint is binding at the optimum implies 
that in the absence of the consumption constraint that the planner would allocate even 
less to consumption and more to expenditures on education and health; i.e. if c
* < cmin 
then E + H = y – lc
* > y – lcmin. Indeed, without the constraint, the planner’s optimal 
choice would be c
* = 0 so that E
* + H
* = y
*. This unrealistic corner solution arises 
only because we have excluded consumption from the education, health and 
production functions. But this exclusion was on the grounds that c  ≥  cmin  is 
                                                 
6 While the optimal plan heavily emphasizes expenditures on education and health, it does not involve 
maximizing the combined expenditure E + H. Recall from the resource constraint that E + H= y - lcmin 
so that maximizing E + H is the same as choosing E and H to maximize y - lcmin subject to the resource 
constraint. The planner’s problem yields the same outcome as this special case in two instances:  (1) 
when lE= lH =0 and w →1 so that the planner maximizes output, and (2) when l is at its upper bound so 
that all remaining expenditures go to education which is the only way to increase output.    
  6sufficiently high not to affect these functions. If consumption c  < c min has a 
sufficiently positive effect (on any of education, health, or production) then the 
optimal choice would be c
*∈ (0, cmin) in the absence of the constraint. Minimal output 
is allocated to consumption when consumption plays an instrumental role and is not 
valued directly.  
 
Even under our simplifying assumption c  ≥  cmin, the stark result  needs 
further qualification. Most obviously, we have assumed that there is sufficient income 
for this is to be a feasible allocation. Less obvious our result depends on the efficacy 
of expenditures on investment and on improvements in education and health being 
valued by the planner; i.e. we have assumed that eE  > 0 and lH > 0 as well as 
 and  . These conditions ensure that the shadow prices of 
expenditures on education and health are always positive. Then we get the result 
because the shadow price of consumption is zero.
min
* c c =
() 0
e




* c c =
7 It is sufficient for our 
result that one of the shadow prices for education and health be positive. In the HDI 
no country has reached the upper bound of 85 year so that the life expectancy index is 
below its upper bound,  . At the same time is it appears that in even the 
riches countries that further health expenditures (and even education expenditures on 
health) are efficacious for life expectancy. We conclude that we can specify 




4.  Equity 
 
Probably the most common concern with the HDI is that it only uses average per 
capita income and, therefore, is consistent with large income disparities within 
countries. Thus, two countries with the same average income would be scored the 
                                                 
7 More elaborate models yield the same result. For example, our static formulation with full 
employment does not consider the possibility that persons do not work for a portion of their life, say 
beyond a retirement age, R, so that the amount of lifetime work is max[l,R]. When life expectancy 
exceeds the retirement age, l > R, this might lead to fl =0 at the margin (if there are no productivity 
benefits associated with greater life-expectancy). Still the objective function is increasing in E and H so 
that the resource constraint binds and the proposition obtains.  
  If we use a rate of consumption y/l instead of y in the objective function, the objective function would 
be increasing in y/l as long as the elasticity fll/f > 1 which is arguably empirically plausible. If fll/f < 1, 
then we need to assume some technical conditions that assure that at least one of the shadow prices on 
E or H is always positive to prove the proposition.       
  7same by the index ceteris paribus, even though one country might have far more poor 
whose meagre ‘command over resources’ substantially inhibits their human 
development. For this reason that Anand and Sen (2000), Foster et al (2005) and 
others have argued that some sort of income inequality aversion should be built into 
the index explicitly. What seems to be missing in the literature is an analysis of how 
policies that promote human development as measured by the HDI affect inequality.  
 
Our analysis has the surprising implication that policies that maximize the HDI score 
should dramatically reduce consumption inequality, ceteris paribus. The optimal 
policy according to Proposition 1 requires c
* = cmin . This implies the optimal plan is 
egalitarian, at least with respect to consumption, even though no inequality aversion 
appears explicitly in the HDI itself. Though income inequality may still remain in a 
market economy, consumption inequality is what matters since a government 
following the optimal plan with access to non-distortionary taxation would tax away 
all disposable income leaving c
* = cmin .
8   
 
To make the argument formally, we model individuals and derive how the planner 
would allocate expenditures for them. Suppose there are i =1, 2, … N individuals in 
the economy and each has a corresponding consumption constraint  
 
ci ≥ cmin (i)        (4’) 
   
Further, education and life expectancy expenditures and attainments might be 
distinguished by individual:  
 
(, ,,) ii i i ee E H E H =        ( 2 ’ )  
(, ,,) ii ii ll E H E H =          ( 3 ’ )  
 
                                                 
8 In practice, the government may only have distortionary tax instruments, in which case it we would 
have a second-best problem. In order to maintain a high level of income, the government would have to 
set taxes in a way that leaves those with higher incomes greater disposable income. We have chosen to 
not fleshing out the second-best problem as this would involve specifying a detailed microstructure to 
the problem and the particular results would depend on the particular microstructure used. Second-best 
problems in taxation are well known to limit the ability of government to implement allocations.       
  8where these functions are non-decreasing in all their arguments (and strictly 
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to capture any external effects. The planner only cares about individual allocations 
insofar as they improve average output, education and life expectancy:       
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The following proposition considers homogenous individuals. In our model, 
individuals are homogenous if they have the same minimum consumption needs, 
cmin(i) = cmin, and their education and life expectancy functions are of the same form, 
and  .    (, ,,) ii i ee E H E H = ( , , , ) ii i ll E H E H =
 
Proposition 2.  Consider an economy of homogenous individuals.   
(a)  Maximizing the HDI requires setting 
*
min i cc =  for all individuals so that the 
society is egalitarian with respect to consumption.     
(b)  Incremental reductions in average consumption increase the HDI score but 
need not be consumption inequality reducing.   
(c)  Maximizing the HDI yields completely egalitarian outcomes for consumption, 
education and life expectancy, when the education and life expectancy 
attainment functions are strictly concave. 
 
Both 2(a) and 2(b) are generalizations of Proposition 1. However, there is an 
important proviso in 2(b): incremental reductions in average consumption may not 
reduce inequality. This follows simply from the fact that a reduction in average 
consumption can be achieved by reducing the consumption of a subset of individuals. 
The scope for dispersion in individual consumption narrows as average consumption 
approaches the minimum. In 2(c) egalitarian outcomes extend to education and health 
when there are diminishing returns to individual expenditures on education and 
health.
9 Overall, Proposition 2 indicates that, if governments use the existing HDI as 
                                                 
9 The analysis assumes that education and health are to an extent rivalrous. If they are considered pure 
public goods, ei =e(E,H) and li =l(E,H), egalitarian outcomes obtain without assuming diminishing 
  9an objective function to devise their plans, then this leads to equitable outcomes – 
through the implied emphasis on maximizing funding to education and health. 
 
Observe that our complete egalitarian result is due to the concavity of the attainment 
assumptions and does not spring from either imposing horizontal equity or from a 
Utilitarian specification.  Of course, deviations from egalitarianism would be optimal 
to the extent that agents are heterogeneous. However, since the index only 
incorporates averages, optimal plans lead to equality of treatment in the sense that the 
planner doesn’t care about the identity of individuals except for identifying their 
consumption, education and health needs. Recall that the minimum consumption was 
motivated as being sufficiently high such that consumption did not impact the 
education, health or production functions. If the constraint was relaxed (as described 
in Section 3), the optimal plan would allocate consumption instrumentally by equating 
and individual’s marginal benefit of the consumption (in terms of the increase in 
education, health and production) to the marginal resource cost.  
 
5. Critique of the Role of Income  
 
The income index  in the HDI was originally justified as an indirect proxy of 
“command over resources to enjoy a decent standard of living” (Human Development 




The emphasis on education and health expenditures in optimal plans naturally leads us 
to consider what role income plays in the HDI. In the optimal plan, given that c
*= 
cmin, the remaining problem of how to allocate resources to E and H is affected by 
 only because of the effects of E and H on production, indirectly through life 
expectancy   and education  . By way of contrast, both   and 
 have direct  impacts on the indexes , and   respectively. This 
reasoning is formalized in the following proposition. 
) (y I
y
) , ( H E l ) , ( H E e ) , ( H E l
) , ( H E e ) (e I
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returns. If education and health facilities are equally accessible to everyone in the economy, perhaps 
because of their public good nature, then maximizing the HDI implies equality of treatment though not 
necessarily outcomes among heterogeneous individuals.     
  10Proposition 3. Consider the weight w < 1 on the income index   in the HDI.  ) (y I
y
(a) When  0 > l f o r   0 > e f , the weight w affects only the trade-off between 
expenditures on education E and health H.  
(b) When  0 = = e , the weight w is irrelevant in determining the optimal plan.    l f f
  
In the general case 3(a), the way that changing w affects the trade-off between E and 
H is complicated and ambiguous, since it depends on all partial derivatives of the 
functions. In special case 3(b), changing w has no affect on the optimal plan so that 
I(w, W) and I(W) yield same optimal plan. Recall that I(W) is the part of the index that 
excludes the income component. Hence in this special case, optimal plans are 




Another way to see the problematic role of income is to examine how increases in 
output are apportioned. In the basic model y = l⋅cmin+E+H and income growth does 
not affect the individual rate of consumption, c.  Rather, Δy = Δ(E+H) + Δl⋅cmin, so 
that output growth is correlated with expenditures E+H and longevity l.  Thus, the 
income component leads to the direct double counting of life expectancy. As the 
income component includes the inputs that increase e(E, H) and l(E, H), it indirectly 
double counts education and life expectancy.  
  
Comparing the HDI with and without the Income Component 
 
One response to our critique -- that the HDI effectively discounts the influence of 
income – might be that it is good news. Some who advocate the human development 
approach are critical of role of income in the index on the basis that it isn’t an 
achievement or functioning per  se but an indirect proxy.
11 They are primarily 
                                                 
10 In the HDI, the education and income indexes have the same weight, W = (1 - W) = ½. However, this 
does not imply that expenditures are equal on education and health. First, the resource constraint E+H 
= f – lcmin reveals that increasing in life expectancy have the cost of overall increasing consumption. 
This feature discourages expenditures that enhance life expectancy compared to education. Second, the 
education and health indexes are not necessarily symmetric nor are the achievement functions e(E, H) 
and l(E, H). 
11 The human development approach, or equivalently the “capabilities approach”, de-emphasizes 
valuing income per se [e.g. Sen (1985), Anand and Ravallion (1993)]. Anand and Ravallion (1993, 
p.136-37) note that while the philosophy of the Human Development Report has been heavily 
  11concerned with how income is converted to education and health achievements. 
Proposition 3 reveals that with optimizing behaviour, the weight on income w is not at 
the expense of pursuing education and health improvements.  However, if income 
were not a desirable objective it would be clearer and simpler to exclude it explicitly 
from the HDI. Generally, w affects the division of resources to education and health 
and in complicated ways. Only in the special case when  0 = = e l f f  is the weight on 
income w irrelevant to the division of resources.   
 
Our analysis can be used to support the view that income plays a problematic role in 
the HDI and should be excluded from the index. To see this suppose W is the true 
relative weight on education relative to life expectancy. Proposition 3(a) implies that 
the outcomes from maximizing I(W) and  I(w, W) are in general different. However, 
since optimization always implies c
*= cmin in both cases, the only difference between 
the allocations is in the division of education and health expenditures towards 
education and health outcomes. This allocation should be done on the basis of the 
parameter  W that weighs these two arguments. It should not depend through the 
constraints on another parameter w that is independent of these arguments in the 
objective function. In the development plans, income does not fulfil its intended role 
of securing “command over resources to enjoy a decent standard of living”. This 
suggests that income plays no useful role in the HDI. In the absence of a replacement 
for an income argument in the HDI, the human development index is better specified 
as I(W).      
 
HDI Rankings of Nations 
 
The propositions have positive and normative implications for how the HDI ranks 
countries. First consider, two nations that are identical in every respect except policy. 
The country with the higher HDI will be the one that is doing a better job of 
maximizing the HDI. However, if we take the stance that I(W) is the better 
development index, then we can only immediately say that country with the higher 
HDI is doing a better job of improving human development in the special case 
                                                                                                                                            
influenced by the capabilities approach, the inclusion of income in the HDI is problematic because 
“…it is not a direct indicator of any achievement or functioning, …”. 
  120 = = e l f f  where weight w is irrelevant to optimal plans. Otherwise, we must we 
must somehow control for the bias induced when w > 0.  
 
Now consider countries that are only different according to multifactor productivity 
(e.g. y = Zf(e,l), where Z is multifactor productivity). If all countries were optimizing 
their HDI, then the country that has a greater multifactor productivity would also have 
the greater HDI. Indeed, since the relationship is monotonic, the ranking of countries 
by HDI and ranking by y would be identical. Thus, under our assumptions, we get the 
prediction that the “development gap ranking”, the rank of GDP per capita less the 
rank of HDI, should be zero.
12   
 
Again, however, if I(W) is considered the better development index, we cannot be 
immediately assured that higher income that leads to a higher HDI ranking is 
promoting development. In principle it is possible that more wealth can lead to worse 
outcomes when the incorrect objective function is being optimized. By similar 
reasoning we also cannot be generally assured that a reduction in the development gap 
ranking is promoting development. This is because the correct development gap 
ranking involves using the rank of I(W) rather than the ranking of I(w, W). 
  
6. Modified Human Development Indexes that Avoid the Critique: Calculation 
and Comparison with the HDI  
 
This section proposes two indexes that are minimal modifications of the HDI that are 
not subject to the above critiques of the income component in the index.  We 
construct and calculate these two modified indexes and then compare their ranking 
with those of the HDI.  
 
The first modified index we propose is the alternative index I(W), which is 
constructed by simply dropping the income component from the HDI. We argued in 
the previous section that this was a better index than the HDI. Dropping the income 
component avoided the double counting problem.  At the same time, there was no loss 
from dropping the income component because it played no role but problematically 
                                                 
12 This statistic is reported in the last column in the HDI statistics pages of the Human Development 
Reports. 
  13biasing the development plans between the education and health components. 
Whereas  I(W) does not suffer from the income critique, it otherwise has similar 
features as satisfies Propositions 1 and 2 for the special case w=0. Thus, we suggest it 
dominates the HDI.  
 
Whereas I(W) may yield a better index than the current HDI, it neglects the dimension 
of  “command over resources to enjoy a decent standard of living”. A simple way to 
represent this dimension and at the same time avoid the income critique is to replace 
the income variable with a “net income” variable that removes the elements 
(education and health) that are double counted.
13 Net income, defined as income less 
expenditures on education and health, is a variable that captures the net command 
over resources for all other purposes than those already represented in the index.  
 
In the our basic model, net income is the same as total consumption, lc=y-(E+H), i.e. 
expenditures on all other items other than education and health.  When either lc or c is 
used instead of income in the objective function, the Proposition 1 result that c = cmin 
no longer necessarily obtains. By putting reasonable economic structure on the 
problem (i.e. concave objective function and convex constraints), it is straightforward 
to establish an internal solution c > cmin, where the planner trades off expenditures on 
education and health for more net income, is the more likely optimal outcome.
14       
 
Whereas using net income in a modified index can yield internal solutions, it can also 
yield outcomes that are less equitable. This is because when optimal average 
consumption is above the minimum, c
* > cmin, there is room for dispersion of 
consumption. For example, it is possible for half of individuals to be at the minimum 
and the other half to be at c
* + (c
* - cmin).  This possibility is not possible under the 
HDI or I(W) criteria as optimal plans require average consumption to c
* = cmin forcing 
                                                 
13 Recall that double counting arose because the optimal plan resulted in increases in the income 
component being matched by increases in education and health expenditures. As these expenditures are 
the inputs into the education and life expectancy indexes, the income component indirectly emphasized 
education and life expectancy. 
14 For example, the current HDI uses ln(GDP/capita) as a variable in the index. Replacing this with 
ln(c) would yield sufficient concavity to generate an internal solution as long as cmin were not too large. 
Indeed, if one interpreted the lower bound of $100 of y in the index as the lower bound for c, almost all 
countries would be at an internal optimum (when the education and health achievement functions were 
responsive to expenditures).    
  14all individual consumption to also be at the same level, cmin.
15 When inequality is a 
concern, our modified HDI with net income should perhaps be further modified to 
incorporate distribution information (e.g. Gini coefficient). In our calculations below 




Constructing, Calculating and Comparing the Modified HDIs with the HDI   
 
Constructing the I(W) index is straightforward for a comparison with the HDI. We 
simply set W=.5 and use the education and health sub-indexes that are contained in 
the HDI. Table 1 below lists the value of the I(W=.5) index, denoted HDIW. The 
table covers OECD nations for the year 2005 (available in the Human Development 
Report 2007). There is a substantial difference in the rankings of the HDIW with the 
HDI.
17  The specific country differences are captured by “Rank of HDI less Rank of 
HDIW” (in the second to last column of Table 1).   
 
It is most instructive to look at the out of the top 25 HDI ranked OECD nations since 
23 of them are in the top 25 of the overall ranking of nations. From the top 25 OECD 
countries, the notable losers are Luxembourg, Ireland, and the US which fall by 7, 8 
and 11 places respectively, whereas, Italy, Spain and New Zealand gain 6, 7 and 14 
places. From the perspective of the model, the fact that the HDIW index ranking is 
quite different suggests that income matters. As income matters only when it is 
problematic in the theory, the case for using HDIW over HDI is more compelling.                  
 
     ( T a b l e   1   h e r e )    
                                                 
15 This analysis contrasts inequality under alternative optimal plans. The scope for differences in 
measured inequality between plans is perhaps less when the reduction in consumption must be 
incremental and the status quo is far from the optimum. As described in Proposition 2, incremental 
changes under the HDI criterion can leave substantial inequalities. When only incremental 
improvements are possible using any of the criteria HDI, I(W), or the modified HDI with net income 
leaves  substantial scope for inequality. 
16 Anand and Sen (2000) and Foster et al (2005) provide explanations and references to ways to include 
inequality aversion for income directly in the HDI . In principle the very same methods could be used 
with our net income variable. However, in practice, there are many nations for which we lack of data 
with which to construct a net income variable at the individual level.  
17 The Spearman rank correlation coefficient (see Rao (1973)) between these two series is .9102, which 
indicates imperfect correlation.  Given that 2/3 of the HDI is perfectly correlated with HDIW and that 
the nations out of the top 25 are substantially different from each other (rank well down in the complete 
list of countries), the value of .9102 suggests that there is a substantial difference between the rankings. 
  15 
We denote the modified index with net income as HDIN. Constructing HDIN 
involves specifying the net income variable and then defining a net income sub-index. 
In keeping with our minimalist approach we base net income on the income (denoted 
y below) in the HDI, i.e. GDP per capita measured in purchasing power parity 
equivalent dollars. We adjust this series to net out the percentage of GDP spent on 
private and public expenditures for education and health. The data for health is 
available in Table 6 of the Human Development Report 2007, and the data on 
education is available in Education at a Glance 2007, an OECD publication.
18  We 
have limited our analysis to OECD countries as it was difficult to find data for private 
education expenditures for other countries and this component is perhaps important, 
particularly in poorer countries many of which do not have much public provision of 
education.  
 
To construct a sub-index for net income, we follow the methodology for the income 
sub-index in the HDI, which is constructed as follows: 
   () () ( )
()( )
l o gy –   l o g1 0 0
y     .




This “achievement” sub-index uses “goalposts” $100 as a lower bound and $40,000 
as an upper bound on income.  The form of the index and the choice of goalposts have 
varied over the years (as described by Anand and Sen (2000)). The logarithm of 
income ensues that there is considerable concavity for this sub-index. In contrast, the 
other indexes for education and health are linear in their variables. The reason for this 
                                                 
18 Both health and education data are a percentage out of GDP for 2004. We assume this percentage has 
not changed substantially for 2005. Much of the data is from lagged studies. To construct the series we 
use some data found in Education at a Glance 2006. Data for Luxembourg includes only public non- 
tertiary education, and data for Estonia and the Russian Federation includes only public education 
expenditures.   
  16specification was to de-emphasize income to alleviate the concerns discussed in the 
previous section.  
 
For net income, denoted y
N, we use the following sub-index:  
() () ( )
()( )
log y  –   log 86
y    





                                                
 
Here we have deflated the lower and upper bound valued by the factor .86. This factor 
corresponds to the average net income over average income across countries. We 
choose this adjustment as it is in the spirit of the income index and works from the 
previous bounds in a way that roughly maintains the same overall weight as the 
income index. It is important to control for the weight otherwise that factor would be 
driving the differences with the HDI. With this index, Norway and Luxembourg are at 
the upper bound. The income index has these two countries and also the United States 
at the upper bound. All the countries are well away from the lower bound.    
 
Though there is substantial variation in our net income series, it does not show up 
strongly in changing the rankings of net income relative to income. The largest shift is 
the United States, which loses 3 places.
19 The lack of change in the sub-index shows 
up in the values and ranking of HDIN in Table 1. The difference in the ranking of this 
series with HDI is listed in the last column. There are relatively few differences and 
the largest difference is again the United States, which looses 2 places.   
  
Clearly of our two modified indexes, the change in rankings with the HDIW is much 
larger than with the HDIN.  This surprised us somewhat. The HDIW contains 
education and life expectancy and so is a subset of the HDI.  Many of the OECD 
 
19 These calculations are available in a spreadsheet upon request.  
  17countries have education scores that are at or very near the upper bound. Similarly the 
life expectancy is high in these countries. We did not think there that the variation 
near the top of the indexes would drive large relatively changes in the rankings. 
Conversely, the variation in net income is not insubstantial and we thought this would 
provide a quite different ranking even though net income is near the upper bound for 
many OECD countries. It would appear that a key factor that is driving the results is 
that the logarithmic concavity of the (net) income index and the linearity of the 
education and life expectancy indexes. Here the lower bound on (net) income appears 
to be a particularly strong determinant as it much smaller than the minimum in the 
series.
20   
 
To our mind using net income in a modified index like HDIN is important because it 
includes the additional dimension of command over resources. However, using a 
methodology to create the net income index that is close to that for the income index 
HDI yields only minor changes. This methodology appears to be deliberately intended 
to de-emphasize (net) income.  This perspective perhaps should be reconsidered if net 
income is used. The fact that the HDIN series is different in the past is not 
substantially different is not reason for using an improved net income based index for 
the future.      
 
7. Conclusion  
 
The HDI is a widely cited statistic that is commonly used as a measure of well being 
in different countries. Here, we have examined some of the implications that follow if 
government planners decide to use maximization of the HDI as a criterion for optimal 
plans. We have found that, if they do so, planners will tend to heavily emphasize 
expenditures on education and health by lowering consumption. This eventually leads 
the economy towards a more egalitarian allocation – even though inequality aversion 
does not appear explicitly in the HDI itself.  
 
                                                 
20 In the income sub-index the lower bound is $100 and the net income lower bound is $86. Contrast 
this with Brazil, which has the lowest income at $8,407 and net income at $7,338. The 25 ranked 
OECD country has income $22,275 and net income $18,933.  
  18A more problematic feature of the optimal plan is that the income component in the 
HDI only plays a role indirectly in determining the trade-off between expenditures on 
education and health. The income component effectively double counts education and 
health achievements, components that are already in the HDI. Because the income 
component does not play its intended role of securing resources for a decent standard 
of living, we argue that it is better to drop income from the index in considering 
optimal plans rather than using the HDI in its current form.    
 
While dropping income from the HDI is a better basis for human development 
planning, this approach falls short of the original intent that the HDI cover dimensions 
beyond education and health. We consider net income, income net of education and 
health expenditures, as an indicator of capabilities not already reflected in the 
education and life expectancy components of the index. When net income is used in a 
modified HDI index, the optimal plan captures the direct trade-offs between 
allocations for consumption, education and health. This yields a balance of 
expenditures on the three components.  
 
Using data OECD countries we construct and calculate two modified human 
development indexes, one with a net income component and another without any kind 
of income component. The rank ordering of nations given by these modified indexes 
is compared with the HDI. Interestingly, the modified index without any income 
component yields a far greater change in rankings. Our theory suggests that this might 
be because the income component in the HDI is problematic. In developing the 
modified index with net income we use a very similar methodology to that used in 
constructing HDI income sub-index. We attribute the lack of change in the ranking 
using this modified index to the methodology of constructing the sub-index rather 
than a deficiency in the net income variable or general approach to correcting the 
index.      
 
In this paper we have taken the somewhat unusual methodological approach of 
evaluating a well-known achievement index, the HDI, in terms of the optimal plans it 
implies. We believe this approach has been quite revealing in uncovering unintended 
negative consequences of using the index for basis for making improvements.  The 
critique of the optimal plans implied by the index lead us to modify the index in 
  19several ways that no longer yielded the unintended consequences. We selected 
amongst the alternative modified indexes according to the one that best fulfilled the 
original intent in creating the HDI.     
  
The analysis of planning with multi-dimensional objectives is inherently complex. 
This is particularly so when there are unusual objective arguments like life expectancy 
which feedback to production and other elements of the economy. We have explored 
the implications of optimal plan with the HDI in the simplest possible environment to 
get a feel for the issues. Whereas we believe we that our simplistic approach has shed 
significant light on the questions we raise, our analysis falls short in a number of 
ways. Our static normative analysis in particular ignores capital accumulation and 
growth issues. Further we do not directly examine the positive issues around incentive 
and participation constraints. We intend to pursue the implications of development 
planning under various objectives in richer model in future research.  
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Proof to Proposition 1. The Lagrangian for problem (P1) is: 
 
LHDI  ( ) )) , ( ( ) 1 ( )) , ( ( ) 1 ( ))) , ( ), , ( ( ( H E l I W H E e WI w H E e H E l f wI
l e y − + − + =  
  () ( ) min 2 1 ) , ( )) , ( ), , ( ( c c c H E l H E H E e H E l f − + − − − + λ λ                           (7) 
 
Among the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for are the following: 
 
                                                      ( ) 0 ) , ( 1 2 = − H E l c λ λ                                               (8) 
                                                           ( ) 0 min 2 = −c c λ                                                   (9) 
                                                         0 1 ≥ λ ,      0 2 ≥ λ                                                (10) 
 
We now show that at an optimum 0 2 > λ . Suppose not. Then, by (10),  0 2 = λ . By (8), 
since   and  , this implies that  0 ) , ( > H E l 0 > c 0 1 = λ . Since the objective function is 
strictly increasing in E and H, the resource constraint (6) binds, and so 0 1 > λ . This is 
a contradiction. Thus,  0 2 > λ . By (9), this then implies that  min c c = . It remains to 
check the constraint qualification when constraint (ii) in problem (P1) is not binding. 
If (i) is also not binding the constraint qualification is trivially satisfied. If (i) is 
binding then the gradient vector to (i) is 
 for c > cmin. When there 
is only one vector, it is linear dependent only if
1 g ( , ,  )  =( , 1 , 1 ) El E e E Hl H e cEH llc fl fe lc fl fe ∇+ − − + − H −
1 g(,  ,   )   = ( cEH ∇ 0, 0, 0). The 
  22assumption in (3), l(0,0) > 0, rules this out. Even without this assumption, the gradient 
must be linearly independent. A necessary condition for linear dependence is 
.  But this condition cannot correspond to local maximum 
because decreasing c to increase E and/or H along the constraint increases the 
objective function. Hence, the constraint qualification is satisfied and the Kuhn-
Tucker conditions are necessary for a maximum. Thus, at an optimum  .  




Suppose policy limits the level to which consumption can be reduced to some level cp 
, where cp > cmin . Then the planner’s problem yields a Lagrangian that is the same as 
(7) except for cp replacing cmin  . As above  2 λ > 0.  Thus, the marginal value of 





λ = −< . It follows that reductions in 
cp increase the Lagrangian, which is just the constrained optimal HDI score. ■ 
 
 
Proof to Proposition 2. The Lagrangian for this problem is: 
 
LHDI  ( ) (( ,) )( 1 ) ( )( 1 )( ) )
ye wI f l e w WI e W I l =+ − + −
l
) 2 m i n
 






fl e E H l c c c λλ
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⎞ ⎛
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Among the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for are the following: 
 
                                                      ( ) 21 / ii i cl N λλ 0 − =                                            (8’) 
                                                           ( ) 2m i n 0 ii cc λ − =                                                (
        
9’) 
                                                 0 1 ≥ λ ,      2 0 i λ ≥                                                (10) 
) This is a generalization of the proof to Proposition 1 and is identical except for 
having to show that 
      
(a
2 0 i λ >  for all i at an optimum.  
lues of cpi > cmin . The 
possibility of increasing inequality is demonstrated in the text.  
(b) The incremental result with respect to average consumption is also a 
generalization Proposition 1 but with individual va
  23(c) Given the strict concavity of the attainment functions ei and li , it follows that 
the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to Ei and Hi must be the same across 
individuals which requires equal allocations and outcomes.   
 
Proof to Proposition 3.  
(a) By Proposition 1,  min c c = . Problem P1 is therefore equivalent to the following 
problem, P2, which determines the choices of E and H: 
( ) )) , ( ( ) 1 ( )) , ( ( ) 1 ( ))) , ( ), , ( ( ( ) , , ( min w c W w I Max =
} , { H E l I W H E e WI w H E e H E l f I
l e y
H E − + − +  
subject to:  ( ) 0 ) , ( ), , ( ) , ( min ≤ − + + H E e H E l f H E c H E l   
(b) Consider an alternative objective function where only the indexes 
and  have weight:  . When 




l )) , ( ( ) ˆ 1 ( )) , ( ( ˆ ) ˆ ( H E l I W H E e I W W I
l e − + =
0 = = e l ) , ( W w I ( ) I W . ■  
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Iceland    0.968 0.960 0.966  1  2  2  -1  -1 
Norway    0.968 0.952 0.968  2  6  1  -4  1 
Australia    0.962 0.963 0.961  3  1  3  2  0 
Canada    0.961 0.956 0.960  4  3  5  1  -1 
Ireland    0.959 0.942 0.960  5  13  4  -8  1 
Sweden    0.956 0.951 0.955  6  7  6  -1  0 
Switzerland    0.955 0.942 0.953  7  12  8  -5  -1 
Japan    0.953 0.951 0.954  8  9  7  -1  1 
Netherlands    0.953 0.946 0.952  9  11  9  -2  0 
France    0.952 0.951 0.950  10  8  11  2  -1 
Finland    0.952 0.946 0.952  11  10  10  1  1 
United  States    0.951 0.926 0.948  12  23  14  -11  -2 
Spain    0.949 0.956 0.950  13  4  12  9  1 
Denmark    0.949 0.938 0.948  14  15  13  -1  1 
Austria    0.948 0.937 0.947  15  17  15  -2  0 
United 
Kingdom    0.946 0.935 0.946  16  18  16  -2  0 
Belgium    0.946 0.937 0.945  17  16  17  1  0 
Luxembourg    0.944 0.916 0.944  18  25  18  -7  0 
New  Zealand    0.943 0.953 0.942  19  5  19  14  0 
Italy    0.941 0.940 0.942  20  14  20  6  0 
Germany    0.935 0.928 0.934  21  22  21  -1  0 
Israel    0.932 0.934 0.930  22  20  22  2  0 
Greece    0.926 0.934 0.928  23  19  23  4  0 
Korea 
(Republic of)    0.921 0.931 0.922  24  21  24  3  0 
Slovenia    0.918 0.926 0.918  25  24  25  1  0 
Portugal    0.897 0.902 0.896  26  26  26  0  0 
Czech 
Republic    0.891 0.892 0.892  27  29  27  -2  0 
Hungary    0.875 0.879 0.875  28  30  28  -2  0 
Poland    0.872 0.896 0.873  29  28  29  1  0 
Chile    0.867 0.901 0.868  30  27  30  3  0 
Slovakia    0.862 0.871 0.864  31  32  32  -1  -1 
Estonia    0.862 0.872 0.864  32  31  31  1  1 
Mexico    0.829 0.853 0.830  33  33  33  0  0 
Russian 
Federation    0.803 0.813 0.806  34  35  34  -1  0 
Brazil    0.800 0.830 0.801  35  34  35  1  0 
Turkey      0.775 0.793 0.777  36  36  36  0  0 
 
 
  25